The Effects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation by Patric H. Hendershott
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Effects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation
Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein, ed.




Chapter Title: Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
Chapter Author: Patric H. Hendershott
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11351
Chapter pages in book: (p. 259 - 294)8 Tax Changes and Capital
Allocation in the 1980s
Patric H. Hendershott
Three tax bills were enacted in the first half of the 1980s: the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Moreover, major
tax reform proposals, most notably the November 1984 Treasury plan
and the May 1985 Administration plan, have been advanced for imple-
mentation in the second half of this decade, and the U.S. House of
Representatives passed a reform bill in December 1985. The passed or
proposed tax changes have altered or would significantly affect both
the overall taxation of capital and taxation in different uses. As a result,
changes in interest rates, homeownership, and investment in various
types of capital have been or would probably be induced. The nature
and extent of these changes are the subjects of this paper.
The method of analysis is the construction and manipulation of a
relatively small simulation model. The principal features of the model
are the dependencies of the demands for various types of capital on
their gross (of depreciation) user costs of capital and of the user costs
on tax parameters and interest rates. Special emphasis is placed on the
housing sector where households at six different income levels make
tenure and quantity-demanded decisions. Finally, the level of taxable
interest rates is determined by equality between the total demand for
capital and the existing capital stock.
The model is first used to simulate the 1981-82 tax changes.
1 The
implied effects of the tax legislation on interest rates, homeownership,
and capital allocation are then compared with observed changes in the
1981-84 period. The model implications are at least roughly consistent
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with observed events. The model is then employed to simulate the
impacts of the Treasury and Administration tax proposals and the House
bill. The proposals are analyzed in a 5% inflation world; the inflation
neutrality of current law and the reform proposals are compared; and
efficiency losses due to misallocation of capital are computed for the
various tax regimes.
8.1 Investment Hurdle Rates or User Costs
8.1.1 General Considerations
As is well known (Hall and Jorgenson 1967), the decision to invest
depends on whether the present value of the expected revenue from
investment exceeds the supply price of capital, and on marginal in-
vestments the two will be equal. After allowance for taxation, the
equilibrium condition for investment is
,n (r + d + yrr)(/ - k - iz) (1
)
 p
 = n^ '
where T is the business tax rate, p is the gross marginal product of
capital, r is the real after-tax financing rate, d is the economic depre-
ciation rate, TW is the concurrent equivalent tax rate on inflationary
gains, TT is the expected inflation rate, and k is the investment tax
credit.
2 In general, z is the present value of the stream of tax depre-
ciation allowances, TAXDEP,, obtained by discounting the stream of
depreciation allowances by the required nominal after-tax financing
rate; taking into account the reduction in depreciable basis if the in-
vestment tax credit is claimed:
TAXDEP,
?, [(1 + rXl + ,)].'
where N is the depreciation period of the asset. The right side of
equation (1) is the "investment hurdle rate" or rental user cost for a
particular asset. The lower the user cost, the greater will be production
of the asset, and the lower will be the productivity of the marginal
investment (p).
In a "neutral" tax system, the net user and thus net marginal pro-
ductivities (p - d) would be the same for all equally-risky assets. This
can be achieved in a variety of ways. For example, with k = 0, T, = 0
and either z = 1—expensing—or T = 0, then p - d = r. If the r's
were equal for all assets, the tax system would be neutral across them.
Alternatively, with k = 0, T,, = 0 and z = dl{r + d)—tax depreciation
equal to economic depreciation, then p - d = r/(l -T). If the r's and
the T'S were the same for all assets, then the system would also be261 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
neutral. Because the T'S are zero for owner-occupied housing, expen-
sing for depreciable assets (and the nondeductibility of property taxes
on owner-occupied housing) would lead to tax neutrality—assuming
equal r's—but setting tax depreciation equal to economic depreciation
would not.
3
Assuming that firms use a fixed fraction of debt, b, for financing all
investments, the real after-tax financing rate can be expressed as
(3) r = [b(\ - PT)I + (1 - b)(l - yi)e - <ir]/(l + IT),
where {3 and 7, respectively, are the portions of interest and equity
returns that are deductible at the business level, and e is the required
nominal return to investors. (Currently [3 = 1 and 7 = 0.) Firms will
choose the b at which the marginal costs of debt and equity, including
contracting and bankruptcy costs, are equal. (Because this marginal
cost is unknown, average values of / and e are used in the calculation
ofr.)
Portfolio equilibrium of investors requires that
(4) (1 - ie)e = (1 - x)i + 8,
where ie is the rate at which equity returns are taxed at the personal
level, x is the relevant tax rate for taxable interest (the lower of the
personal tax rate and that implicit in tax-exempt yields), and 8 is the
risk premium required on equity investments. For all investments ex-
cept owner-occupied housing of low- and middle-income households,
x is the tax rate implicit in tax-exempt yields xe. Substituting (4) into
(3), the real after-tax financing rate for capital other than owner-oc-
cupied housing is:
(3') r = [b{\ - PT)I





 8 - ir]/(l + ir).
1 - 7e
If T7 were equal to Te (which would be true if 7 = 7e = 0) and xe = |3T,
r would equal [(1 - |3T)/ - IT + 8(1 - b)]/(l + IT) for all assets. Fur-
ther, if all interest expense were deductible at the same rate and all
investments were equally risky, all r's would be equal.
For corporations, ie depends on the taxation of dividends and capital
gains and the division of equity raised between new issues and retained
earnings (Auerbach 1979). More generally,
(5) je = mdiv + (1 - n)icg,
where n is the proportion of equity funds raised by new issues, and tdiv
and Tcg, respectively, are the effective tax rates on dividends and equity
capital gains. In general, idiv = T,m/2andTc^ = (1 - exclu)iimIA, where T/m is the effective maximum tax rate on personal interest and exclu is262 P&tric H. Hendershott
the statutory capital gains exclusion. The divisions by 2 and 4 allow
for tax deferral and avoidance activities. An n of 0.1 is assumed; as a
result, 7e is relatively low (0. 14T/W under current law). For noncorporate
businesses (including households investing in owner-occupied hous-
ing), Te equals 0.
Empirically, the tax rate implicit in tax-exempt yields varies with the
maturity of the security. For short-term tax exempts, the ratio of prime
grade tax-exempt to risk-free taxable yields has not deviated far from
unity less the corporate tax rate or roughly 0.5. For 10-year bonds,
which are more relevant for the long-term investments being analyzed,
the ratio has been closer to 0.7. The implicit tax rate of 0.3, rather than
the federal tax rate of 0.46 (the state and local tax rate is not relevant
if corporations invest in their own jurisdictions), reflects a number of
factors, but the most important is likely the tax saving from optimally
trading bonds (e.g., taking capital losses and deferring capital gains).
4
This is especially important because high transactions costs virtually
eliminate any gains from trading municipal bonds. The tax rate implicit
in long-term tax-exempt yields is assumed to be given by:
(6) xe = (p - 0.3)7,,
where Tyis the federal corporate tax rate and the 0.3 measures the gains
from optimal trading.
All interest expense is not deductible at the same rate, the clearest
example being owner-occupied housing. Because this asset is held by
households with a wide range of income subject to the full array of
marginal personal tax rates, the tax rates at which interest is deductible
(and at which equity the owner has in the house would have been taxed
had the household rented) vary across households.
5 More generally,
the real after-tax financing rate for the jth household is
(7) rj = [bj{l - T,)I + (1 - bj){\ - Xj)i - TT + 8, ]/(l + IT).
The tax rate applicable to own equity investment, xJf is defined as the
minimum of the tax rate paid on the last dollar of taxable interest
earned, PT,-, or that implicit in tax-exempt yields, xe.
For all investments other than real estate, b = 1/3. For real estate
investments other than owner-occupied housing, b = 2/3. This as-
sumption is consistent with available data on large-scale (over 50-unit)
rental projects, which probably accounted for over two-thirds of the
rental units constructed in the 1970s.
6 The data in table 8.1 indicate
that ownership of these properties has shifted sharply from corpora-
tions to partnerships over the past two decades (the vast majority of
additions to the stock have certainly been owned by partnerships),
most of these properties have mortgages (97% of those owned by part-
nerships in 1980), and the initial loan-to-value ratio on the 81% of263 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
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Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Residential Finance
Sections of 1960, 1970, and 1980 Census of Housing.
properties with a first mortgage at time of purchase is 87%. In 1970,
the median loan-to-value ratio was 67%. The median was only 53% in
early 1981, when mortgage rates were at historic highs and terms had
been quite unfavorable for refinancing for 3 years. The two-thirds ratio
is a reasonable approximation for a present-value, weighted average
loan-to-value ratio in normal times.
For owner-occupied housing, we vary bj depending on the relative
attractiveness of debt and equity financing. More specifically,
(8) bj = •
0.667 if Xj = T,
0.85 if Xj < T>
By our definitions, Xj cannot exceed T7. While these ratios far exceed
the 0.33 to 0.4 average economy-wide ratio observed for owner-occupied
housing, the observed ratio is heavily influenced by older owning house-
holds who have repaid their mortgages and are relatively insensitive
to housing rental costs (see below).
7 Households under 40 use far more
debt (the average loan-to-value ratio for first-time homebuyers in 1984
was 87%) and often make quite long-term housing decisions. It is the
decisions of such households that we are attempting to model, and their
present-value, weighted-average, loan-to-value ratio is probably near
two-thirds.
Based upon Ibbotson-Sinquefield calculations, we assume 8 for cor-
porate equities is 0.075, and thus the risk premium for corporate assets,
which have a one-third loan-to-value ratio, is (1 -&)8 = 0.05. The risk264 Patric H. Hendershott
premium for depreciable real estate investors in properties with roughly
0.80 initial loan-to-value ratios is also about 0.075.
8 Because these real-
estate assets have a mean loan-to-value ratio of two-thirds (initial ratio
of near 80%), their risk premium is only 0.025. For owner-occupied
housing, a premium of 0.01 is assumed. This relatively low premium
is consistent with owners having certainty with regard to their "va-
cancy" and "breakage" rates and thus greater certainty with respect
to their net operating incomes than is the case with rental properties.
8.1.2 Tax Parameters
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 list the important business tax parameters under
the laws existing in 1980 and 1981-85, in the proposed Treasury and
Administration tax plans and in H.R. 3838 passed in December 1985.
The 1981 Tax Act roughly halved depreciation tax lives and lowered










































































































aThe 1982 Tax Act reduced the depreciable base by one-half the tax credit.
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structures, raised the percentage for industrial structures, and main-
tained straight-line for commercial real estate (straight-line is preferred
over accelerated methods due to more onerous recapture provisions
upon sale).
9 The 1981 Act promised more accelerated methods in 1985,
but the 1982 Tax Act reneged on the promise and reduced the depre-
ciable base for equipment by one-half the investment tax credit. The
1984 Act raised the tax life for structures, other than public utilities,
back to 18 years and this was raised further to 19 years in late 1985.
The 1981 Tax Act also cut the maximum federal tax rates from 0.48
to 0.46 for corporations, and from 0.7 to 0.5 for households. We assume
that the marginal noncorporate investor was in the 54% bracket in 1980
(at roughly the same real income level at which the 49% tax rate applied
in 1985). The income tax rates in table 8.3 presume a 0.06 state and
local tax rate deductible at the federal level.
The personal tax rates on real corporate equity returns follow from
equation (5) and the surrounding discussion, given a capital gains ex-
clusion of 0.6 (0.0 under the Treasury plan, 0.5 under the Administra-
tion plan and 0.42 in the House bill). The tax rate implicit in tax-exempt
yields follows from equation (6). Finally, the inflation tax, rm, is 0.7T
on inventories because FIFO accounting is used for 70% of inventories
and is effectively zero for other assets.
The Treasury plan attempted to neutralize the tax system for inflation
by indexing everything. Only real capital gains, including those on
inventories, would be taxed (TW = 0); depreciation would be on a re-
placement, rather than historic, cost basis; and only the "real" part
of interest expense would be taxed and could be deducted.
1
0 The Trea-
sury plan also attempted to tax all assets and business forms (except
owner-occupied housing) equally. To this end, tax depreciation for each
depreciable asset would equal the Treasury's best estimate of true
economic depreciation; the investment tax credit would be dropped;
real capital gains would be taxed at the regular income tax rate; and
half of corporate dividends would be deductible at the corporate level.
The indexation of inventory gains, the removal of the tax credit, and
the proposed tax depreciation treatment would result in p - d equaling
r/(l - T) for all properties except owner-occupied housing, and the
partial dividend exclusion would reduce discrepancies between the r's
for corporate and noncorporate investments.
The Administration plan retreated from these principles in significant
respects: all interest would continue to be deductible; investors in
nondepreciable assets would have the option of paying taxes on nominal
capital gains at one-half of the regular income tax rate; tax depreciation
would exceed economic depreciation; only one-tenth of dividends would
be deductible; and, in order to make the plan revenue neutral, the
indexation of inventory gains would be dropped. Tax depreciation would
be especially generous for equipment that continues to be classified as267 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
3 or 5 years and for public utility structures; allowable depreciation
would exceed that under current law even at zero inflation. However,
most 5-year equipment would be reclassified as 6- , 7- , and even 10-
year equipment. For industrial structures, tax depreciation would be
more favorable only at inflation rates of roughly 5% or greater. The
House bill has double declining balance depreciation for equipment and
public utility structures, but longer depreciation tax lives than the
Administration plan and only partial indexation of the depreciable base
(half of the inflation above 5%) results in significantly less favorable
overall depreciation.
The partial dividend exclusion is of little import in our model because
only 10% of equity financing is assumed to be from new share issues
on which dividends are paid. (Dividends are saved initially by the
retention of earnings, offsetting the future payment of dividends.) Thus
y in the model is only 0.05 under the Treasury plan and 0.01 under the
Administration plan, 10% of the 50 and 10% exclusions, respectively.
In our analysis of owner-occupied housing, we consider households
at five different income levels in order to deduce the tax rates that are
representative of households in five income ranges. The ranges for 1980
are listed in the top panel of table 8.4; the 1985 ranges, which exceed
those from 1980 by a third to two-fifths to reflect the growth in nominal
incomes per household, are listed in the lower panel. (The exact income
levels for which the tax rate calculations were performed are listed in
parentheses.) The state-and-local and federal tax rates relevant to the
quantity-demanded decision in 1980 are listed in the next two columns
in the top panel, and the total tax rate—the federal plus the state times
one minus the federal—is shown in the fourth column. For the highest
income class, Xj = xe. For the other classes, the xj equals p (equals 1
except in the Treasury plan) times the T, shown in the table. The interest
indexation feature of the Treasury plan (fJ < 1) has a major impact on
the opportunity cost of own equity financing of owner-occupied housing
(as well as on tax-exempt yields—see note a to table 8.3).
n The last
column is the tax rate relevant to tenure choice (a weighted average
of the average tax rates applied to debt and equity).
1
2 The lower panel
lists similar calculations for 1985 incomes under current law and the
tax reforms, the Treasury and Administration proposals reflecting the
nondeductibility of state and local taxes.




The basic model allocates a fixed private capital stock among various
classes of nonresidential and residential capital. The allocation depends
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ticities of demand with respect to the rental costs, and the elasticities
of homeownership with respect to the cost of owning versus renting.
The interest rate adjusts in response to tax changes so as to maintain
the aggregate demand for capital at its initial level. The fixed capital
stock assumption implies zero interest elasticity of saving.
Table 8.5 lists the distribution of the U.S. capital stock at the end of
1984 by type. A number of simplifying assumptions are made in the
construction of the model. Because well over 90% of inventories are
held by corporations and nearly 90% of rental housing is held by non-
corporate business, we assume that each of these assets is held totally
by corporate and noncorporate business, respectively. While equip-
ment is depreciable over 3 or 5 years, about 95% of it is classified as
5-year. We treat all equipment as 5-year. Because public utility struc-
tures (which are virtually all corporate) are depreciated over a shorter
life than other structures and are eligible for the investment tax credit,
they are treated separately. With these assumptions and distinctions,


































































Sources: Data for all assets except inventories and public utilities are from Musgrave
(1984). The inventory data are from the Federal Reserve (1984); the aggregate public
utility data are from unpublished data supplied by John Musgrave; and the 1/3,2/3 division
between 10 and 15 years are based on the fraction given in Gravelle (1982).270 Patric H. Hendershott
the capital shares in 1980 and 1984 are those listed in the percent share
columns. The last column indicates that a reallocation of capital toward
equipment and commercial real estate occurred between 1980 and 1984.
Current law treats owner-occupied housing differently depending upon
the tax position of the owner, with higher-income households paying
a lower rental cost owing to their lower after-tax financing rate. Thus
it is necessary to distribute the housing stock across households at
different income levels. The distribution depends upon the number of
owners within each income range as well as the income range and the
rental costs for each of the ranges.
For all assets except rental housing, the demand for the asset is
determined by the investor in the asset, be it a corporation, unincor-
porated business or a household. For rental housing, demand is deter-
mined by renters, based upon their incomes and the market rent level.
Thus, the total quantity of rental housing, like the total quantity of
owner housing, is built up as the sum of the demands by households
in different income brackets.
Table 8.6 indicates divisions of the demand for housing across the
same five income classes listed in table 8.4, with a lower-income class
of all renters added. The first three columns contain the income classes
selected, the division of 80 million households across these classes,
and the assumed ownership rates for these classes. Columns 4 and 5
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classes. Column 4 is the product of the first three columns divided by
the sum of the products. In the column 5 calculation, the fraction of
households owning is replaced by the fraction renting. Columns 6 and
7 give the distribution of the owned and rented stocks. These distri-
butions and the ownership rates were calculated from model equations
described below. Based upon 1980 data, the equations imply an aggre-
gate ownership rate of 0.59, slightly below that existing then.
8.2.2 Model Equations
The model explains 13 rental costs: seven for the different types of
nonresidential capital, five for owner-occupied housing of households
in our five income ranges, and one for rental housing. As discussed in
the previous section, these costs depend on numerous provisions of
the tax law, the depreciation rate of the asset, the expected inflation
rate and the level of interest rates in the economy. Moreover, rental
costs for household tenure choice decisions (pj) differ from those for
quantity demanded decisions (pj) because the tax rates relevant to the
after-tax financing rates differ (see table 8.4). We summarize the rental
cost equations as
Pk - Pk(taxk,dk,TT,i)
(13) p = p(tax,d,Tt,i)
(14H18) p, =
There are seven demand equations for nonresidential capital (NK):
corporate inventories, corporate and noncorporate 5-year equipment,
10- and 15-year public utility structures, and other corporate (industrial)
and noncorporate (commercial) structures. Assuming that production
functions are Cobb-Douglass (Berndt 1976), these demand equations
can be written as
(19M25) NKk = Zklp
k, where the Zk are constants (depending on given outputs) and the p* are
the rental costs.
The housing demand and tenure choice equations come from the
specification of a translog indirect utility function for households (King
1980) and the empirical application of it to the ownership decision
(Hendershott and Shilling 1982). The estimated odds-of-owning equa-
tion was
logyz— = -3.846/0£[p/(p/.9)] - .383[(/ogp,-)
2 - (log p/.9)
2].
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The division by 0.9 reflects the fact that those renting have to pay more
than the user cost to offset the revenues lost from vacancies. Taking
antilogs and solving, the ownership rates for the five highest income
classes are
(26M30) oj = e
Lj/(\ - e
Lf),
where the Lj equals the right-hand side of the log [oj{\ - Oj)] expres-
sion. The ownership rate for the lowest-income class is assumed to be
zero.
There are also five demand equations for owner housing and six for
rental housing based on our six income classes, the lowest of which
consists solely of renters. These demands are the products of the de-
mands per owning/renting household and the number of owning/renting
households. The specific form of the equations comes from application
of Roy's identity to the indirect utility function and substitution from
the estimated odds of owning equation. For owner housing (OH), the
demand equations are
(31)-(35) OHj = OjHHjZj(3.S46 + .766 log p^/p,-,
where Oj is the ownership rate for thejth class, HHj is the number of
households in the jth class, and the Z7 are constants which are pro-
portional to the incomes of representative households in the classes.
For rental households (RH), the equations are
(36)-(41) RHj = (1 - OJ)HHJZ/3.846 + .766 log p/.9)/(p/.9),
where p/.9 is the rental price facing all renting households.
Lastly, equality between the sum of the demands and the existing
capital stock determines the level of interest rates in the economy:
(42) %NKk + XOHj + XRHj = K.
Given a specific tax regime and assumed levels of the interest and
expected inflation rates, the p*, p,, p,, and p can be computed. The NKk
were listed in table 8.5, and the OHj and RHj are products of the total
residential structures share reported in table 8.5 and the fractions of
those shares listed in table 8.6. The Oj and HHj were also listed in table
8.6. The Zk can be calculated from equations (19)—(25); the Z, are
proportional to the incomes of the representative households in the
classes and are scaled such that the sum of the demands for owner and
rental housing (as proportions of the total capital stock) equals the
existing housing stock (as a proportion of total capital).
A number of simplifying assumptions of the model should be noted.
These include, but are not limited to, constant risk premia and infinite
real supply price elasticities (zero transactions costs) and thus constant273 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
real asset prices. Simulated changes in the allocation of capital are thus
meant to indicate how the composition of net investment would be
altered by tax (and inflation) changes, not precisely what the new capital
allocation will be 5 or 10 years following a change in tax regime or
inflation rate.
8.3 The Changing Tax and Inflation Environment, 1980-85
In this section we deduce the impact of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 on interest rates, the homeownership rate, and the allo-
cation of real capital. Because over 4 years have now passed since the
passage of ERTA, we can also "test" the underlying simulation model
by comparing the simulated impact of the Act with observed events.
This requires analyzing all major disturbances that have occurred since
early 1981, not just the passage of ERTA. The first part of this section
simulates the impacts of ERTA alone and of ERTA combined with a
decline in the inflation rate. The second part compares the simulated
impacts with observed changes in recent years.
8.3.1 ERTA and Disinflation
The disturbance of major interest to us is the passage of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. As documented in Section 8.1, this Act
substantially enhanced tax depreciation allowances and lowered per-
sonal tax rates. A second major phenomenon in the early 1980s was a
reduction in the inflation rate. In 1980, inflation was proceeding at a
10% rate; by 1984 and 1985, the rate was slightly below 4%. We presume
that the decline in the long-run expected inflation rate was a smaller
drop from 8 to 5%, the 10% reflecting temporarily surging energy prices
and declining value of the dollar and the 4% rate reflecting the reverse.
The first column of table 8.7 lists the assumed 1980 interest and
inflation rates, the model simulated homeownership rate, and the 1980
distribution of the capital stock listed in table 8.5. The second column
contains the model simulation results for these variables (except for
the assumed constant inflation rate) based upon enactment of ERTA.
The third column reflects ERTA (and the 1982 reduction in the depre-
ciation base by half of the investment tax credit) plus a decline in the
inflation rate to 5%. These simulations are discussed in turn.
Comparing the second and first columns, the more favorable tax
treatment of depreciable property provided by ERTA raises the demand
for such capital at pre-ERTA interest rates. While the cut in personal
tax rates lowers the demand for owner-occupied housing—the after-
tax financing rate and opportunity cost of owner equity rise—the de-

































































capital, so interest rates rise.
14 The computed increase is just over a
percentage point.
In spite of this increase, the hurdle rates for equipment, industrial
structures and public utilities decline by 2V2, Wi and 1 percentage
points, respectively. Those for depreciable real estate are roughly un-
changed (the interest rate increase and more generous depreciation
roughly offsetting), while those for inventories and owner-occupied
housing increase by just over a percentage point. The homeownership
rate declines by AV2 percentage points. On net, the capital stock is
shifted sharply from residential to nonresidential uses, with the aggre-
gate housing stock declining by 9Vi%. Of the nonresidential compo-
nents, the increases are roughly 10% for equipment and industrial
structures and about 5% for public utilities and commercial real estate.
Inventories decline by 1%.
Incorporating a 3 percentage point decline in the inflation rate sharply
alters the results. Because the interest rate declines by roughly a point
and a half for each point decline in inflation, disinflation is good for
owner-occupied housing; the real after-tax financing rate will decline
for households in tax brackets below 33%. Thus we see a 4 percentage
point increase in the homeownership rate relative to the case of no
decline in inflation. The total housing stock is roughly unchanged,
however; the increase in owner-occupied housing is about offset by
the decline in rental housing. The disinflation also induces a shift in
the composition of structures, with corporate structures rising and
highly-levered noncorporate structures declining (the advantages of
debt are reduced at lower interest rates).275 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
8.3.2 A Comparison with Observed Changes
Model simulations should not be expected to track observed eco-
nomic changes closely. Simulations provide an estimate of where an
economy in full equilibrium at the initial parameter values will even-
tually move in response to a specified disturbance (change in model
parameters, structure or state of the world). However, even if the model
accurately characterizes the economy, the observed economic changes
may differ from those implied by the model for two reasons. First, the
economy may have been far from full equilibrium when the disturbance
occurred. If the tendency toward this equilibrium differs significantly
from the tendency created by the specified disturbance, the observed
changes in the economy may not resemble the simulated changes.
Second, disturbances other than those specified may have occurred. If
these have impacts that correlate negatively in some respects from the
specified disturbances, again the simulated changes may differ signif-
icantly from the actual changes. Nonetheless, simulations of the major
disturbances to an economy should trace out the broad contours of
subsequent economic events.
The principal phenomena that the model simulations would lead us
to expect are:
a. an increase in long-term interest rates until the decline in long-run
expected inflation sets in,
b. a shift from owning to renting, until the impact of the decline in
long-run expected inflation is felt, and
c. a shift from residential (and inventory) to nonresidential uses, es-
pecially equipment investment early on.
The correspondence of observed events with each of these expectations
is discussed in turn.
Table 8.8 contains data on the corporate bond rate and two measures
of the December-to-December changes in the CPI: all items less food,
energy, and home purchase and finance and the new CPI X-I, which
became the official CPI after 1982. The major difference between the
inflation series is the exclusion of food and energy from the former;
these components rose particularly rapidly in the late 1970s and 1980
and slowly in the 1982-84 period. The bond rate certainly jumped in
1981 and 1982. The rate exceeded 14% for the entire July 1981-July
1982 period (was over 15% in September-October 1981 and January-
February 1982) before plummeting by year end 1982. The 1-year infla-
tion rate also plummeted in 1982 and has continued to drift downward
since then. A lagged response of long-run expected inflation to short-
run observed inflation would suggest a gradual decline in the former
throughout the 1983-85 period. In general, we would anticipate that
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Sources: Economic Report of the President, Tables B-55 and B-66, 1985 (and earlier
years).
*CPI excluding food, energy, and shelter.
with post-1984 data gradually reflecting the ERTA plus disinflation
simulation.
The correspondence between simulations of the homeownership rate
and observed changes is especially tenuous because the changes are
quite sensitive to shifts in the age composition of the population. To
illustrate, the aggregate rate rose by only 3V2 percentage points between
1960 and 1979, even though ownership rates of every age cohort rose
by close to 10 percentage points. The reason for this discrepancy was
a surge in young households (under 25) who tend to rent and a relative
decline in older households (over 34) who predominantly own. The
data in table 8.8 illustrate the dependency of ownership on age. Old
households tend to be less mobile, have higher incomes, and be wealth-
ier, characteristics that lower the effective cost of owning.
The data in table 8.9 refer to married couples only in order to abstract






















































Source: Annual Housing Survey and Housing Vacancy Survey.277 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
parable for all households. As can be seen, a shift to homeownership
occurred for all age groups between 1974 and 1980 and even continued
after 1980 for households over age 54. For younger more mobile house-
holds that are more likely to be making tenure decisions based upon
current economic conditions, 1980 was a watershed for ownership. In
just 3 years, the ownership rate for those under 40 declined by 4 to
6!/2 percentage points, just as would be anticipated under the ERTA
scenario. Whether the offsetting disinflation impact will be observed
in later data is uncertain.
The ERTA simulation suggests a large decline in residential struc-
tures and an increase in equipment. These shifts are reflected in the
1984 data (see table 8.4) with the equipment share already up by half
the predicted 11% increase and residential structures down by one-
quarter of the estimated 9
!/2% decline. Much of the observed decline
is certainly due to the changed behavior of younger households. If this
change were allowed to work its way through to older households in
a long-run adjustment, the decline in residential structures would ap-
proach the large simulated decline.
The observed reallocation of nonresidential structures does not cor-
respond nearly as well with the hypothesized partial movement to the
simulated new equilibrium. Commercial structures have already in-
creased in share by more than the simulated amount, while public utility
structures have declined significantly as a share of the total capital
stock (not increased as the simulation predicts) and industrial structures
have risen little. Even here, plausible explanations are available. The
expansion of the rehabilitation tax credit in ERTA, which is not re-
flected in the simulations, must have significantly increased the value
of commercial structures; moreover, high vacancy rates suggest that
commercial structures have been overbuilt—the new equilibrium could
entail a less than 4% increase in this share. As for the relative decline
in public utility structures, energy conservation in response to the sharp
run up in real energy prices in the 1979-81 period and the well-publicized
problems of the nuclear power industry are likely causes. Dwelling on
such explanations is probably not worthwhile; the important fact is
that observed data, on the whole, are not inconsistent with the ERTA
model simulation.
1
5 Thus, the simulation model appears to be a rea-
sonable vehicle for analyzing the impact of proposed tax reforms.
8.4 Capital Allocation Under Current Law and
Proposed Tax Reforms
The likely impacts of the Treasury and Administration tax reform
proposals and the House bill on the level of interest rates, rental user
costs, capital shares, and the homeownership rate are calculated in this278 Patric H. Hendershott
section. We begin with a comparison of the risk-adjusted net user costs
and interest rates under current law and the reforms and then turn to
the capital stock effects. The analysis presumes 5% inflation. The sen-
sitivity to inflation of various tax regimes is then examined, and effi-
ciency losses from the misallocation of capital under the regimes are
calculated.
8.4.1 Five Percent Inflation: Net Rental Costs
The risk-adjusted net (of depreciation) rental costs for alternative
investments are reported in table 8.10 for current law and three reforms.
(The risk adjustment is 0.04 for nonreal estate assets and 0.015 for
depreciable real estate.) The interest rate (risk-free) under current law
is presumed to be 10% (slightly above the 91/2% model simulation of a
5% inflation world with ERTA tax law). The first numbers (those not
in parentheses) given for the reforms are based upon the listed model-
computed interest rates; the numbers in parentheses presume an un-
changed 10% interest rate.
Under a neutral tax system, the risk-adjusted net hurdle rates would
be the same for all assets. As can be seen, this is far from true under
current law. The tax-favored assets are housing of high-income owners
and noncorporate equipment. The tax-penalized assets are corporate
structures, especially industrial structures that receive no tax credit,
and inventories, whose inflationary gains are not indexed (with
TW = 0.7T, T = 0.5 and TT = 0.05, the inflation tax raises the user cost
by 0.035). More generally, corporate investments are penalized relative
to noncorporate; less-leveraged investments are penalized relative to
more-leveraged investments; and risky assets are penalized relatively
to less risky assets (Bulow and Summers 1984). The over 3
!/2 percentage
point difference in net hurdle rates for industrial and rental structures
reflects all three penalties. The largest penalty is the difference in asset
risk, 0.05 for nonreal estate versus 0.025 for real estate, which accounts
for 2 of the 3
1/2 points. The corporate (double taxation) penalty is the
smallest, accounting for only Vi of the 3V2 points because the taxation
of corporate equity at the personal level is relatively light under the
new view of corporate financing.
The Treasury plan greatly reduces the difference in risk-adjusted net
hurdle rates among corporate assets by eliminating the inventory tax
and the investment tax credit. All hurdle rates move toward that for
industrial structures. The gross hurdle rate (net plus depreciation rate
plus 0.04) for equipment rises by 14% and that for public utility struc-
tures rises by 8%, while that for inventories (with their 100% depre-
ciation) falls by 3%. However, the plan increases the advantages of
real estate. While the hurdle rates for depreciable properties are roughly
unchanged (at 3 points below those for corporate assets), those for279 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
owner-occupied housing decline significantly; the 2.6 percentage point
fall in the level of interest rates swamps the loss of the property tax
deduction and the reduction in rates at which interest is deductible.
The increased advantage of owner-occupied housing stems from two
factors: removal of tax advantages for business capital (especially the
investment tax credit), and the introduction of an additional advantage
for owner-occupied housing (the nonindexation of mortgage interest
expense). The data in the third column of table 8.10 are calculations
assuming the Treasury plan were amended to include indexation of
home mortgage interest expense. As can be seen, full indexation lowers
the interest rate by another 30 basis points and the hurdle rates for
business investments by 40 basis points. In contrast, the declines in
the hurdle rates for middle-income owner-occupied housing are re-
duced by 25 basis points, and high-income owner-occupied housing
faces a 50 basis point rise in hurdle rate.
The Administration plan drops interest indexation (and thus the new
advantage for owner-occupied housing), deletes inventory indexation
(in the revisions needed to achieve revenue neutrality), and "gives
back" part of the investment tax credit by accelerating depreciation
deductions for equipment and public utilities relative to economic de-
preciation; the present value of a dollar of depreciation on 5-year equip-
ment increases from 76 to 85 cents, while that for 15-year public utilities
rises from 50 to 76 cents or by over 50%. The latter change is so
generous that the investment hurdle rate actually declines in spite of
the loss of the ITC. With these changes, the level of interest rates falls
by only 60 basis points, and the net result is a tax system that is less
tilted toward high-income owner-occupied housing than current law.
The House bill postpones depreciation deductions, except on equip-
ment, even more than the Treasury plan and does not index deprecia-
tion deductions unless inflation exceeds 5%. As a result of these changes
and the removal of the investment tax credit, the aggregate demand
for capital falls sharply and a 125 basis point decline in the level of
interest rates occurs, a decline which significantly lowers the cost of
owner-occupied housing at all except the very highest income levels.
Like the Treasury plan, the House bill would tend to equalize net user
costs across corporate investments.
As discussed, the model computes the level of interest rates that
would maintain the aggregate demand for capital (net investment in a
growth context) at its prereform level. However, a decline in U.S.
interest rates would represent a decline in after-tax returns to foreigners
unless foreign countries cut their marginal tax rates on interest income
or move their interest rates pari passu with those in the U.S. As a
result capital would flow out of the U.S. and domestic interest rates
would not need to fall as much to bring the demand and supply of280 Patric H. Hendershott
capital in the U.S. into balance. In the extreme case of no adjustment
in foreign taxes or interest rates and perfectly elastic international
capital flows, U.S. interest rates would not fall at all but the U.S.
capital stock would, the fall being greater the larger is the decline in
interest rates computed from the fixed-capital stock model.
1
6 A more
balanced view would incorporate less than perfectly elastic capital
flows and significant changes in foreign interest rates in response to
movements in U.S. rates. Thus a fall in foreign demand for U.S. capital
would tend to dampen the decline in U.S. rates, but not eliminate it.
To indicate the sensitivity of the relationships among the adjusted
net rental costs to the computed interest rate declines, rental costs
Table 8.10 Interest Rates and Risk-Adjusted Net Rental User Costs (Expected
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based upon no rate decline have been computed and are listed in pa-
rentheses in table 8.10. With higher (than the model-computed) interest
rates, the rental costs are higher. For the Administration and House
reforms, the relationships among the costs are little affected. For the
Treasury plan, the already strong bias toward owner-occupied housing
is magnified because all home mortgage interest is deductible, whereas
only the real component of interest financing other investments is.
8.4.2 Five Percent Inflation: Capital Stock Impacts
The data in table 8.11 suggest how the capital stock would be real-
located under the various reforms. These reallocations follow fairly
directly from the realignment of investment hurdle rates just discussed.
Removal of the inflation tax raises inventories, while the loss of the
investment tax credit tends to shrink equipment and utilities, although
utilities would actually rise in response to the far more generous de-
preciation allowances of the Administration plan. The Treasury and
Administration reforms have sharply different impacts on the three
types of structures. Under the Treasury plan, residential structures rise
by 8%, while industrial and commercial structures are unaffected. Un-
der the Administration plan, the reverse is true; residential structures
are roughly unchanged while industrial and commercial structures rise
by 8%. Moreover, the homeownership rate rises by 6 percentage points
under the Treasury plan, but falls by 4 points under the Administration
plan. The reallocations under the House bill are close to those of the
Treasury plan, although the increase in the homeownership rate is only
V/i percentage points.
In general, an across-the-board cut in tax rates would be expected
to have a negative impact on owner-occupied housing, the income from
which is not taxed. This impact would be reinforced by a loss of the
deductibility of property taxes on primary residences. Thus, the home-
ownership rate would decline, as would the share of structures in
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residential use. The simulated effect of the Administration plan cor-
responds to these expectations. The inverted effect of the Treasury
plan follows from its interest indexation provision and the sharp decline
in interest rates (largely in response to the indexation). A decline in
interest rates is more beneficial to investors in low tax brackets than
to those in high brackets because the investor receives more of the
rate decline (and the Treasury receives less). Thus a sharp decline in
interest rates is particularly beneficial to housing demanded by low-
and middle-income owners. This factor is exaggerated in the Treasury
plan by the exemption of home mortgage interest expense from the
interest indexation feature. Thus housing of owners at all income levels
(but especially at lower incomes) increases, and the homeownership
rate jumps. The demand for owner-occupied housing would also rise
under the House bill. This reflects the absence of a cut in the tax rates
relevant to the quantity-demanded decision of owners with incomes
under $100,000 (see table 8.4), the continued deductibility of property
taxes, and the sharp 125 basis point decline in interest rates.
8.4.3 Inflation Neutrality
Next we consider the impact of inflation under the various tax re-
gimes by simulating an increase in inflation from zero to 10%. Inflation
is quite negative for owner-occupied housing under current law because
the average tax rate at which expenses are deductible is significantly
less for owner housing (except for owners with very high incomes)
than for other capital. Thus, the real after-tax interest rate paid by
owners tends to rise, while that for other capital falls (see Titman 1982
and Follain 1986).
1
7 On the other hand, inflation is very positive for
depreciable real estate because the advantages of debt are magnified
at higher interest rate levels. Thus the increase in inflation lowers the
homeownership rate by 11 percentage points (the first column of table
8.12), and raises the demand for both rental and commercial structures,
the latter by 19%. The total housing stock increases because the stim-
ulus to renter housing outweighs the negative impact on owner housing.
With real estate expanding, the other capital components must decline.
As can be seen, di/dir = 1.46, midway between the nontax (unity) and
tax [di/dir = 1/(1 - T)~2] Fisherian values.
The Treasury plan makes a serious attempt at achieving inflation
neutrality by setting tax depreciation equal to economic depreciation
and indexing capital gains, depreciation allowances, and interest. Un-
fortunately, the plan fails badly. To understand the failure, it is best to
consider first the impact of an increase in inflation in a fully-indexed
variant of the Treasury plan, i.e., one in which home mortgage interest
expense is also indexed. The data in the second column of table 8.12















Percentage Changes in Capital in Response to an Increase in Expected



















































sector with the highest tax rate (noncorporate business has a tax rate
of 0.41 versus 0.37 for the corporate sector) because the after-tax in-
terest rate rises least. The aggregate homeownership rate declines be-
cause the negative impact on lower-income (tax) households outweighs
the positive impact on high-income households. The interest rate rises
by more than the increase in inflation because of imperfect indexation;
under our assumptions, only a third of interest is real at 5% inflation
[(7.42 - 5)/7.42], but the Treasury indexation formula would treat six-
elevenths as real (see note 10). With some inflationary interest being
taxed, the interest rate responds more than one-for-one to inflation.
Nonetheless, the fully-indexed variant of the Treasury plan is signifi-
cantly less sensitive to inflation than current law; more specifically the
sharp tilt toward depreciable real estate is greatly dampened.
Exclusion of home mortgage interest from the indexation provision
changes the impact of inflation enormously. Homeownership and the
demand for owner-occupied housing are greatly stimulated by inflation
because the real-after tax financing rate for even our lowest-income
owning households declines. The surge in housing is matched by de-
clines in all other capital types. The actual Treasury plan proposed is
even less inflation neutral than current law.
The next to the last column in table 8.12 shows the impact of inflation
on capital allocation under the Administration tax plan. Just as under
current law, the homeownership rate would be significantly lowered by
inflation. However, the stimulation for depreciable real estate and con-
striction of nonresidential capital would be far less. The Administration
plan is thus significantly more inflation neutral than current law. The284 Patric H. Hendershott
last column suggests that the House bill would be marginally more
neutral than current law.
8.4.4 Efficiency Losses
The differences in the risk-adjusted net rental costs in table 8.10
provide a general indication of the misallocation of capital under the
various tax laws. A single efficiency loss number for each tax regime
is computed from the Harberger equation:
LOSS = ^(EFFADJp - ADJp^CAPj - EFFCAPj),
j
where the ADJp/s are the risk-adjusted net user costs listed in table
8.10, EFFADJp is the single risk-adjusted net user cost (0.0406) that
when used to obtain gross user costs equates the sum of the demands
for capital to the aggregate stock, the CAPj are the likely percentage
capital stocks under a given tax law (listed in table 8.13), and the
EFFCAPj are the percentage allocations when the gross user costs are
based on EFFADJp. The efficient allocation of capital is listed in the
first column of table 8.13.
The efficiency loss under current law, listed at the bottom of table
8.13, is roughly 0.12% of the capital stock or about 0.25% of GNP.
1
8
The major source of the loss is 10% too much residential capital (largely
offset by 24% too few industrial structures and 12% too few utility
structures).
1
9 The widely-cited overinvestment in equipment is only
3%; while substantial overinvestment in equipment exists relative to
corporate structures, overinvestment relative to capital generally is
minor. Of the three reforms, only the Administration plan reduces the
efficiency loss, and the reduction is a sharp 50%. This is achieved by
both a better allocation between residential and nonresidential capital
(the overinvestment in residential capital is reduced from 10 to 8%)
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and better allocations within the residential and nonresidential sectors.
The difference between the net user costs for the highest- and lowest-
income owning households is reduced from 0.029 to 0.018, and the
large underinvestment in corporate structures is reduced significantly.
The Treasury plan and the House bill would increase the efficiency
loss by 53 and 36%, respectively, the principal reason being the further
overinvestment in residential capital (18 and 17% versus the current
10%). Not only do these bills remove the investment tax credit for
equipment and utilities, but they reduce the value of depreciation de-
ductions. The greater efficiency loss under the Treasury plan relative
to the House bill is attributable to a substantial increase in the existing
bias in favor of owning over renting. This, in turn, is due to the great
advantage of debt financing of owner-occupied housing given by the
partial taxation of interest income but full deduction of home mortgage
interest expense. The fully-indexed Treasury variant (only real mort-
gage interest expense is deductible) leads to a smaller increase in res-
idential capital, a better allocation within residential, and thus a negligible
6% increase in the efficiency loss.
Efficiency losses have also been calculated at different inflation rates.
The losses under all tax regimes are lower at a zero inflation rate and
greater at 10% inflation. For current law, the loss is 12% less at zero
inflation and 37% greater at 10% inflation. The efficiency loss under
the Administration plan is roughly half that of current law over the
entire inflation range examined. At zero inflation, the losses under the
Treasury plan and House bill are virtually identical to those under
current law. At higher inflation rates the losses, especially under the
Treasury plan, increase relative to current law; at 10% inflation the loss
under the Treasury plan is nearly double that under current law. Such
is not the case with the fully-indexed Treasury variant; its loss at 10%
inflation is slightly less than that of current law.
8.5 Summary
The paper begins with presentation of a methodology for computing
annual rental costs of capital or investment hurdle rates under any tax
regime. Tax law over the 1980-84 period is specified and the provisions
of the Treasury and Administration tax reform proposals and H.R.
3838 are described. A model is then constructed to allow calculation
of the impact of changes in tax regimes and/or expected inflation on
interest rates and the allocation of real capital. The model allocates a
fixed private capital stock among various classes of nonresidential and
residential capital, depending upon the rental costs for the capital com-
ponents, the price elasticities of demand with respect to the rental costs,
and the elasticities of homeownership with respect to the cost of owning286 Patric H. Hendershott
versus renting. The interest rate adjusts in response to tax/inflation
changes so as to maintain the aggregate demand for capital at this initial
level.
Simulation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 suggests an
increase in interest rates, a decrease in homeownership, and a shift in
capital from residential to nonresidential uses, especially equipment.
Data since 1980 are consistent with these "forecasts" when one ab-
stracts from the impact of the decline in inflation on interest rates after
the middle of 1982. The decline in ownership is restricted to younger
(under 40) households who are likely to be making tenure decisions
based upon current economic conditions. The general correspondence
between these simulations and recent economic events suggests that
the simulation model is appropriate for analyzing the impact of pro-
posed tax reforms.
Under a neutral tax system, the risk-adjusted net (of depreciation)
investment hurdle rates would be the same for all assets. This is far
from true under current law. The tax-favored assets are housing of high-
income owners and noncorporate equipment. The most tax-penalized
asset is inventories, whose inflationary gains are not indexed. Corpo-
rate structures are also penalized, especially industrial structures that
receive no tax credit. More generally, corporate investments are pen-
alized relative to noncorporate; less-leveraged investments are penal-
ized relative to more-leveraged investments; and risky assets are
penalized relative to less risky assets.
The Treasury plan greatly reduces the difference in risk-adjusted net
hurdle rates among corporate assets by eliminating the inventory tax
and the investment tax credit. However, the plan increases the advan-
tages of real estate. While the hurdle rates for equipment and utilities
rise to that for industrial structures, those for owner-occupied housing
decline significantly in response to a 2.6 percentage point decline in
interest rates (and the nonindexation of home mortgage interest ex-
pense). The Administration plan drops interest indexation and accel-
erates depreciation deductions for equipment and, especially, public
utilities relative to economic depreciation. With these changes, the level
of interest rates falls by only 0.6 percentage points, and the demand
for owner-occupied housing by middle- and high-income households
declines. In contrast, the House bill has even less general depreciation
allowances than current law. Consequently, hurdle rates for equipment
and utilities rise sharply, while the 125 basis point decline in interest
rates lowers hurdle rates for owner-occupied housing. The basic results
are the same in the absence of interest-rate declines; hurdle rates de-
cline relatively for owner-occupied housing under the Treasury plan
and House bill, but not under the Administration plan. That is, whether
rates decline or not, the former two proposals would tilt the playing287 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
field toward owner-occupied housing, the most tax-favored asset under
current law.
Reallocation of the capital stock follows fairly directly from the re-
alignment of investment hurdle rates. Removal of the inflation tax raises
inventories, while the loss of the investment tax credit tends to shrink
equipment and utilities, although utilities would actually rise in re-
sponse to the far more generous depreciation allowances of the Admin-
istration plan. While the specific provisions of the Treasury plan and
the House bill differ widely, these two reforms should be expected to
have remarkably similar impacts on capital allocation. In contrast, the
Administration plan would have a sharply different impact on the three
types of structures. Under the Treasury and House plans, residential
structures rise by 8%, while industrial and commercial structures are
largely unaffected. Under the Administration plan, the reverse is true.
Moreover, the homeownership rate rises significantly under the Trea-
sury and House plans, but falls by 4 points under the Administration
plan.
Inflation is quite negative for owner-occupied housing under current
law because the average tax rate at which expenses are deductible is
significantly less for owner housing than for other capital. Thus, the
real after-tax interest rate paid by owners tends to rise with an increase
in inflation, while that for other capital falls. On the other hand, inflation
is very positive for depreciable real estate because the advantages of
debt are magnified at higher interest rate levels. While an increase in
inflation lowers the homeownership rate, commercial structures in-
crease sharply. Moreover, total housing increases because the stimulus
to renter housing outweighs the negative impact on owner housing.
With real estate expanding, the other capital components decline.
The Treasury plan makes a serious attempt at achieving inflation
neutrality by setting tax depreciation equal to economic depreciation
and indexing capital gains, depreciation allowances, and interest. Un-
fortunately, the plan fails badly. While a fully-indexed variant of the
Treasury plan would be less sensitive to inflation than is current law,
exclusion of home mortgage interest expense from the indexation pro-
vision of the Treasury plan reverses this result. Homeownership and
the demand for owner-occupied housing are strongly stimulated be-
cause the real-after tax financing rate for even low-income owning
households declines. The surge in housing is matched by declines in
all other capital types.
Just as under current law, the homeownership rate would be signif-
icantly lowered by inflation if the Administration plan or House bill
were in place. However, the stimulation of depreciable real estate and
the constriction of nonresidential capital would be far less under the
Administration plan. The Administration plan is thus significantly more288 Patric H. Hendershott
inflation neutral than current law; the House bill would be mildly more
neutral.
Of the three plans, only that proposed by the Administration would
lead to a more efficient allocation of capital, i.e., one that is less biased
toward high-income housing and away from corporate structures. The
current efficiency loss would be roughly halved. The Treasury plan,
while equating hurdle rates across corporate assets, would greatly in-
crease the current efficiency loss at positive inflation rates by stimu-
lating additional overinvestment in housing. The increases in the loss
would be roughly 50% at 5% inflation and nearly 100% at 10% inflation.
The House bill, too, would increase the efficiency loss, and for the
same reason, but the increase would be a smaller 25 to 40% at inflation
rates between 3 and 10%.
Notes
1. Earlier simulation analyses of ERTA include Gravelle (1982) and Hen-
dershott and Shilling (1982).
2. We do not consider the impact of imperfect loss offsets. For an analysis
of these and other details of corporate taxation, see Auerbach (1983).
3. Because property taxes on owner-occupied housing are deductible, the
tax saving from these taxes on a dollar of housing (assuming a property tax
rate of 0.012) is subtracted from the right side of (1).
4. Optimal bond trading is discussed in Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984).
Other sources of the low implicit yield in longer-term tax exempts are the
greater risk of losses due to default and call on municipals relative to Treasuries
and the 80% limitation of the portion of interest on indebtedness used to carry
tax exempts that commercial banks can deduct.
5. While the explicit and implicit tax rates relevant to the quantity-demanded
decision are marginal rates, those relevant to the decision of whether to own
or rent depend on the average rates at which interest for the entire house
purchase is deducted and on which the entire owner-equity investment would
have been taxed (Hendershott and Slemrod 1983).
6. One million of the 1-4 unit properties in 1980 were no more than a decade
old, as were 77,500 of the 5-49 unit properties and 22,700 of the over-50 unit
properties. With 1.3, 11, and 160, respectively, as the average number of units
in each of these three classes of properties, 63% of the total units no more
than a decade old were in properties with 50 or more units. Because a significant
number of the 1-4 unit properties were originally built for ownership, two-
thirds to three-quarters of the newly-constructed rental units were probably in
properties with 50 or more units.
7. 60% of owning households with incomes under $15,000 in 1983 had house-
to-income ratios exceeding 4, suggesting that the households were retired and
did not have a mortgage. In contrast, 80% of owning households with incomes
over $25,000 had mortgages and only 5% with incomes above $25,000 had
house-to-income ratios above 4.
8. The National Association of Homebuilders (1985, p. 51) assumes a 14%
value for e when IT is 6%. This inflation rate translates into a tax-exempt rate289 Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s
just above 8% in our model and thus a risk premium of about 6%. Price-
Waterhouse has used an e of 16% in their calculations.
9. The 1981 act also expanded the investment tax credit slightly. Both this
expansion and the more generous depreciation deductions were effective 1
January 1981.
10. The Treasury would assume a real interest rate of 6% and allow the
deduction of (or would tax) only 6/(6 + IT) of interest paid (or earned), where
TT is the actual inflation rate in a tax year. Thus if inflation were 5%, only 55%
of interest would be taxed and deducted. With zero inflation, all interest would
be taxed and deducted; with 10% inflation only 38% would. (However, mort-
gage interest outlays on one's principal residence would be fully deductible.)
11. Because only 55%/38% of nominal interest income would be taxed in a
5/10% inflation world, the tax rate relevant to own equity financing would be
55%/38% of the marginal rates shown in table 8.2 or the tax-exempt rate,
whichever is less.
12. The methodology for computing these tax rates is discussed in Hender-
shott and Ling (1986).
13. The model is both an extension and simplification of that used by Hen-
dershott and Shilling (1982) to analyze the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981. The extension is a more detailed treatment of nonresidential capital; the
simplification is an exogenous specification of risk premia. Gravelle (1985) uses
a somewhat similar model to analyze the Treasury plan. Fullerton (1985) ana-
lyzes the impact of the Treasury plan on effective tax rates.
14. Higher interest rates pulled in foreign capital, but the dampening effect
of this inflow on rising interest rates is assumed to have been offset by increased
Federal deficits.
15. Bosworth (1985) makes the somewhat contrary argument that business
investment in recent years is not consistent with the passage of ERTA.
16. In simulations where the aggregate capital stock was determined endog-
enously as that consistent with the imposed 10% interest rate, the total capital
stock falls by 15% in the Treasury simulation, 8% in the House bill simulation,
and 3% for the Administration plan.
17. This statement would seem to be at variance with the sharp shift to
homeownership in the 1970s. The latter occurred because interest rates did
not fully reflect expected general inflation and expected house price inflation
likely exceeded expected general inflation by 2 to 3 percentage points.
18. This is an understatement of the loss because it does not take into account
inefficiencies created by industry specific tax provisions or by tax-exempt
financing of private purpose activities. Moreover, the gains from removing
such inefficiencies by, say, the Treasury plan are understated.
19. The loss is independent of the presumed risk premium associated with
owner-occupied housing (p — d— 8 is independent of 8) and is largely indepen-
dent of its presumed loan-to-value ratio (under current law an advantage of
debt financing exists only for high-income owners).
References
Auerbach, A. J. 1979. Wealth maximization and the cost of capital. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 93 (August): 433-46.
. 1983. Corporate taxation in the United States. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 2: 451-505.290 Patric H. Hendershott
Berndt, E. R. 1976. Reconciling alternative estimates of the elasticity of sub-
stitution. Review of Economics and Statistics (February): 59-68.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1984. Balance Sheets for
the U.S. Economy (April).
Bosworth, B. P. 1985. Taxes and the investment recovery. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity 1: 1-38.
Bulow, J. I., and L. H. Summers. 1984. The taxation of risky assets. Journal
of Political Economy 92: 20-39.
Constantinides, G. M., and J. E. Ingersoll, Jr. 1984. Optimal bond trading with
personal taxes. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (September): 299-335.
Follain, J. R. 1986. Another look at tenure choice, inflation and taxes. Office
of Real Estate Research Working Paper no. 24, University of Illinois (January).
Fullerton, D. 1985. The indexation of interest, depreciation, and capital gains:
A model of investment incentives. NBER Working Paper no. 1655 (June).
Gravelle, J. G. 1982. Effects of the 1981 depreciation revisions on the taxation
of income from business capital. National Tax Journal 35 (March): 1-20.
. 1985. Assessing structural tax revision with economic models: The
treasury tax proposals and the allocation of investment. Congressional Re-
search Service, The Library of Congress (April 8).
Hall, R. E., and D. W. Jorgenson. 1967. Tax policy and investment behavior.
American Economic Review 57 (June): 391-414.
Hendershott, P. H., and D. C. Ling. 1986. Likely impacts of the Administration
proposal and the House Bill. In Tax Reform and Real Estate, ed. J. Follain.
The Urban Institute.
Hendershott, P. H., and J. D. Shilling. 1982. The impacts on capital allocation
of some aspects of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Public Finance
Quarterly (April): 242-73.
Hendershott, P. H., and J. Slemrod. 1983. Taxes and the user cost of capital
for owner-occupied housing. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban
Economics Association (Winter): 375-93.
King, M. A. 1980. An econometric model of tenure choice and the demand
for housing as a joint decision. Journal of Public Economics 14: 137-59.
Musgrave, J. C. 1984. Fixed reproducible tangible wealth in the United States,
1980-83. Survey of Current Business (August): 54-59.
National Association of Home Builders. 1985. Impacts of the President's tax
proposal on housing (July).
Titman, S. D. 1982. The effect of anticipated inflation on housing market equi-
librium. Journal of Finance 37: 827-42.
Comment Harvey S. Rosen
Summary
Hendershott's paper uses a relatively small simulation model to ana-
lyze the effects of tax law changes on the allocation of capital. He
specifies the model, plugs in parameter estimates, and simulates the
Harvey S. Rosen is a professor of economics at Princeton University and a research
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effects of 1981-82 tax law changes. The simulation results are then
compared with the actual pattern of changes in 1981-84. Even given
Hendershott's caveat that simulation results are not intended to mimic
real world changes, it is very brave indeed to submit one's results to
this kind of test.
Standard user costs of the Jorgensonian type form the backbone of
the model. One interesting aside in the discussion of user costs is worth
special note. This concerns the necessary conditions for achieving neu-
trality (in the sense of equal net marginal productivities for all assets).
Typically, either expensing depreciable assets or setting tax deprecia-
tion equal to economic depreciation will do the trick. However, things
change when owner-occupied housing is included in the set of assets.
As long as the imputed rent from owner occupation is not subject to
tax, only expensing will secure neutrality.
The various user costs are inserted into a capital allocation model,
which allocates a fixed private capital stock among various classes of
nonresidential and residential capital. The interest rate equilibrates the
demand with the (fixed) supply of capital. An important feature of the
model is the fact that there are five components to the demand for
owner-occupied housing, one for each of five income brackets. The
demands for the various types of capital are generated by assuming
cost minimization subject to a Cobb-Douglas technology, and the de-
mand for housing is based on a translog indirect utility function sug-
gested by King (1980).
When it comes to doing the tax simulations, Hendershott makes the
important point that if one hopes to replicate the actual course of
events, then not only must tax law changes be analyzed, but other
important changes in the economic environment must be as well. In
this case, the key event is the reduction in the inflation rate. Hender-
shott finds that ERTA by itself would have shifted the capital stock
sharply from residential to nonresidential uses, but incorporating a 3
percentage point decline in the inflation rate sharply alters this result—
the total housing stock is roughly unchanged.
How well do the simulation results mimic actual changes? As far as
housing goes, Hendershott argues that the model does pretty well,
especially if one is careful to disaggregate housing demand by age. The
results for nonresidential structures are not as good, but Hendershott
argues that the model's predictions are still close enough to use the
simulation model to analyze the impact of tax reform with some con-
fidence. The impacts of various reforms are then analyzed; the results
include estimates of the changes in capital allocation that each reform
would generate, and the associated welfare loss. The welfare losses
for both the status quo and the various proposals are generally less
than 1% of GNP.292 Fatric H. Hendershott
Comments
This is a medium-sized model. I think that this is a nice size. It is
complicated enough to surprise, but sufficiently small so that once you
have been surprised, it is possible to figure out why. For example, some
have argued that under the current tax regime, inflation tends to stim-
ulate owner-occupation relative to investment capital, because the cap-
ital gains from owner-occupation are for all intents and purposes exempt
from taxation (see the papers summarized by Rosen 1985, pp. 400-
401). In Hendershott's model, however, owner-occupation is hurt by
inflation because the average rate at which expenses are deductible is
significantly less for owner-occupied housing than for other capital.
As I now proceed to list some possible deficiencies of the model, I
will try to distinguish between problems that could be remedied, still
maintaining the basic simple character of the model, and those that
would require major increases in its complexity. It turns out that most
of the changes that one might desire really would require substantial
increases in the complexity of the model.
Uncertainty. Beyond the inclusion of (exogenous) risk premia for
certain assets, there really is not much consideration of uncertainty in
this model. There are several ways in which uncertainty might influence
capital allocation decisions: (a) capital income uncertainty of the sort
discussed by Bulow and Summers (1984) might lead to different rates
of economic depreciation than those posited in the model. Further,
these rates might be endogenous to changes in the tax system; (b) the
tax system might be serving a risk-sharing function as suggested by
Tobin (1958); in this case the allocational effects might be smaller than
those estimated in the paper; and (c) uncertainty about the tax laws
themselves may affect investment decisions. To see the potential se-
riousness of this consideration we need only reread the first paragraph
of Hendershott's paper, which reminds us of the many statutory changes
that have been made in the space of a few years. Indeed, it is still far
from clear what the tax law will look like a year from now. However,
the user costs in this paper implicitly assume that investors believe that
the current law will last forever. Having pointed this out, however, I
cannot think of a way to incorporate it that would be both simple and
compelling.
No other distortions. In general, the welfare losses from the distor-
tionary tax treatment of capital depend on other distortions in the
economy. In this model, there are no other wedges. The leisure-income
decision is not considered. Similarly, intertemporal consumption trade-
offs are ignored. (For the most part, the model assumes that saving is
perfectly fixed; even where this assumption is relaxed, no serious choice
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housing in this paper, it is important to contemplate the existence of
housing market distortions. Mills (1986) argues that housing is perhaps
the most heavily regulated of all important sectors of the economy;
just think of the rules regarding financing, sales, land use, construction,
etc. To the extent that such regulations lead to less housing than oth-
erwise would be the case, one could argue that favorable tax provisions
for housing in the federal tax code are an improving distortion. But it
is hard to think of a way in which such considerations could be intro-
duced without complicating the model greatly.
No disequilibrium. In evaluating his model's predictions, Hender-
shott notes that "even if the model accurately characterizes the econ-
omy, the observed economic changes may differ from those implied
by the model" if the economy was "a significant distance from full
equilibrium when the disturbances occurred." This statement, while
true, is potentially devastating to the paper. If a disequilibrium was
possible when a disturbance occurred, then a disequilibrium could have
generated the data used to calibrate the model. If this is the case, it is
not clear what to make of the underlying parameter estimates. That
this is a real danger seems to be implied by the econometric literature
on investment functions, which indicates the presence of long adjust-
ment lags to changes in the cost of capital. However, no one yet has
provided a generally accepted way for modeling disequilibria; it would
surely be unfair to require this analysis to do so.
Model of housing behavior. One of the unique features of this model
is the very close attention given to the housing sector. Housing demand
functions are allowed to vary by income class, and both the tenure
choice and the quantity demanded decisions are examined. As noted
above, the housing demand and tenure choice equations come from a
translog indirect utility function suggested originally by King. Regard-
ing this specification, it is important to note the following: (a) it imposes
homotheticity; (b) it assumes that the same utility function generates
the tenure choice and quantity demanded decisions. From a theoretical
point of view this is entirely desirable. However, when King tests that
hypothesis (conditional on the translog specification), it is rejected by
the data; (c) it assumes that the same parameters apply to each income
class; and (d) it is a bit hard to interpret, in the sense that it is not
obvious what the parameters imply for price elasticities of demand for
each of the income groups.
The purpose of King's paper was to estimate housing demand func-
tions in the presence of rationing. It was therefore necessary to have
an explicit utility function, and the translog form was perfectly suitable.
However, it seems to me that given Hendershott's desire to provide a
relatively rich model of housing demand, an alternative research strat-
egy could have been selected. Use cross-sectional data to estimate294 Patric H. Hendershott
simple tenure choice and quantity demanded functions separately for
each income group, and use these instead of the indirect translog func-
tion. The inability to exhibit an explicit utility function is unimportant
in the current context. I expect that implementing this suggestion would
make the predictions more reliable and the model easier to understand.
And it could be done without increasing substantially the complexity
of the exercise of the whole.
I have another comment related to the treatment of housing. Ob-
viously, things could be simplified considerably if there were only one
representative owner-occupier instead of five of them. Hendershott
argues strongly that disaggregation by income group is really important.
He could strengthen that case if he actually did some simulations as-
suming only one type of owner, and showing that this assumption leads
to very erroneous conclusions.
Finally, I would like to give some attention to the paper's estimates
of the welfare loss of the system of capital taxation. Hendershott es-
timates that the efficiency cost of the status quo is one quarter of 1%
of GNR Is this big or small? Certainly, there are a lot of dollars in-
volved. But compared to the political costs of "reforming" the tax law,
and the economic costs created by uncertainty over what the future
law will be, the cost of distortionary capital taxation may not be all
that huge. If we take Hendershott's results seriously, perhaps the tax
law we should endorse is one which promises not to make any changes
in the next five years.
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